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In twenty American states, regulatory environmental programs are combined with either public health or
natural resource conservation programs. Natural resource conservation and public health agencies have
historically embraced regulatory styles that rely less heavily on enforcement, while the Environmental
Protection Agency cites enforcement actions, such as monetary penalties, as being pivotal to protecting the
environment and public health. In this dissertation, I ask the following question: what regulatory style
emerges from the combination of these differing preferences for the use of enforcement. Through in-depth
case studies, interviews with environmental agency workers, and time-series analyses on enforcement
actions, I find that the choice to nest regulatory environmental programs within preexisting natural resource
conservation and public health agencies helps to maintain an anti-enforcement agency culture that is
inherent within natural resource and public health agencies. This anti-enforcement culture continually
affects how agency workers think about enforcement actions. As a result, combined agencies categorize
less violations as severe and penalize violators less than independent pollution control agencies. This is
especially the case for those agencies where natural resource conservation and environmental protection
are combined. In these agencies, the effect of the combined structure persists, even when other traditional
predictors of regulatory behavior are considered, including the states' environmental ideology and the
partisanship of state legislatures and governors. 
